Abstract submission deadline: September 21, 2025
Full paper submission deadline: March 15, 2026
From wars to geopolitical rivalries and terrorism-related threats, the digital economy giants colloquially known as „Big Tech“ corporations are increasingly involved in issues of national and international security. Most often, their involvement stems from their services and platforms serving as new theaters of conflict in cyberspace (Singer & Brooking, 2018; Jeangène Vilmer et al., 2018; Charon & Jeangène Vilmer, 2021; Marangé & Quessard 2021; Schaake, 2024). In such cases, the role of Big Tech companies in conflict is an infrastructural, near invisible one, as the services they provide and manage are used as proxies or intermediaries for conducting or resolving conflict (Musiani et al. 2016). In other cases, these firms are themselves objects of conflict, most notably in the context of global superpower rivalries.
In international relations scholarship, it is commonly assumed that private corporations act as “ambassadors” of their country of origin and that their technical innovations are prolongations of national power on the world stage (Carr, 2016; Strange, 1996; Keohane & Nye, 1998). Conflict situations involving Big Tech are therefore becoming more common with the internationalization of Chinese internet giants, signaling the emergence of non-American Big Tech; indeed, the politicisation of competition between US and Chinese tech firms – and governments – is in the continuation of long-standing controversies and oppositions, but also shaping up security conflicts in unprecedented ways. Big Tech companies are increasingly becoming actors of global security in their own right. They are developing relations to security and foreign policy bureaucracies in the various regions of the world where they operate, sometimes even “co-producing” security alongside public authorities (Bellanova & de Goede, 2022), as in the case of the European Union, which has shown particular leadership in legislating Big Tech, sometimes with a “Brussels effect” for the rest of the world (Bradford, 2020). In other cases, Big Tech firms launch their own initiatives, like the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) (Douek, 2020; Borelli, 2021) or play a crucial role in the establishment and implementation of sanctions regimes (ten Oever et al., 2024). In practice, this often means a privileged access to public authorities and international fora, and the ability to impose standards („best practices“, definitions, processes), as well as to form coalitions to defend their interests. Vice versa, some states have nominated “tech ambassadors” (Denmark, France, etc.), thereby officially recognizing their influence in global politics (Jacobsen, 2024). Lastly, Big Tech is also becoming further integrated within the existing multilateral international security governance landscape, for instance by participating in United Nations Security Council, G7 or G20 meetings (Hurel & Lobato, 2018; Fairbank, 2019). In the military realm, where Big Tech is often seen more as a vendor than as an actor, NATO has recently manifested interest in further cooperation with Silicon Valley as well. Further, in even more recent times, Big Tech has been observed as creating new dimensions of risks related to national security in contexts and situations where strategic autonomy is lacking.
These developments point to a privatisation of security, characteristic of reconfigurations of the state and the public-private boundary in the context of neoliberal globalization (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010; Abrahamsen & Leander, 2016), wherein security is increasingly managed by “assemblages”, or “fluctuating arrangements of networks of state, corporate and other voluntary actors” (Tréguer, 2019: 148). This, of course, is not a new phenomenon, particularly so in cyberspace, where private actors have long been involved in cybersecurity and internet governance (Carr, 2016; Dunn Cavelty, 2016). But, even as Big Tech is cementing its influence on “technical” governance fora and issue areas, it is also increasingly engaging in more political -and politicized- aspects of security governance, such as armed conflicts, counter-terrorism and foreign interference.
Considering that “security privatization (…) is not simply a question of a transfer of previously public functions to private actors but indicates a more fundamental rearticulation of the public–private and global–local relationship” (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010, p. 219), how do national and international bureaucracies and regulators manage their relationship to Big Tech corporations in security-related domains? How do they organise to navigate these relationships? How is the political division of labour negotiated, and what are the power dynamics within the novel “assemblages” of networked security governance involving Big Tech? The salience of these questions increases as Big Tech becomes further integrated into global security governance, but such public-private relationships are especially difficult to investigate because of the cultures of secrecy and opacity traditional to both security bureaucracies and Big Tech. Leaks, scandals and transparency efforts (voluntary or mandated) provide periodic glances into the workings of these actors, and recent scholarship also shows that revolving door phenomena, freedom of information requests and public tendering records can provide fruitful insights (Tréguer, 2019; Thibout, 2021; Valdivia et al., 2022; Gorwa, 2024).
Such developments invite us to look beyond the instrumental study of Big Tech platforms, services and technologies, and turn our attention to the agency of these actors in global security governance. With this in mind, we aim to initiate a holistic discussion on the diversity of the security roles played by these companies, how they “learn to see the world through a security lens” (de Goede, 2018:26), manage their relationships to traditional security actors, and become integrated into security governance infrastructures.
A number of disciplinary perspectives and fields of study are relevant to this theme, and the goal is to bring together their respective contributions. This special issue will be of relevance for, and expects contributions from, a range of disciplines including but not limited to international relations, political science, media studies, security studies, science and technology studies and political economy. Reflections on the methodological challenges involved in researching these topics are encouraged and appreciated.
We welcome submissions that explore, but are not limited to, the following topics:
Big Tech in international relations
- What are the public-private relations between Big Tech and security bureaucracies in various contexts? A decade after the Snowden revelations, what do we know of public-private relations between Big Tech and security apparatuses in their countries of origin ?
- What is the role of Big Tech when public authorities themselves constitute a threat to security ?
- If Big Tech firms become central in security governance networks, does it make them harder for public authorities to regulate?
Big Tech in the global landscape of Trust & Safety
- How are they navigating the increasingly demanding and fragmented regulatory landscape pertaining to Trust & Safety as global companies?
- How does the “revolving door” phenomenon of security professionals between academia, Big Tech and public service work? What is its impact on security policies?
- How is Trust & Safety shaping up as a distinct professional field within the tech industry? What are the definitions/understandings of security it is crafting?
Big Tech as arbiters in the field of security
- How do Big Tech companies craft their “crisis response” to position themselves or try to remain neutral when their services are used during armed conflicts or insurrections?
- What is the role of Big Tech in the design and implementation of international sanctions?
- How do Big Tech companies integrate security considerations into their respective product development processes, platform governance and internal organization?
- How do Big Tech companies arbitrate between freedom of speech, user safety and national security concerns, all the while balancing them with their commercial interests?
Practical information
- Please send your 400-words abstract and a one-paragraph bio to bigtechinsec@protonmail.com before 21 September 2025. If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to us.
- The selection of abstracts will be based on the quality of the abstract and its suitability to the topic. The result of the abstract selection will be confirmed to potential authors no later than 15 December 2025.
- If your abstract is selected you will be invited to submit a working paper. As part of the publication process you commit to submitting your working paper by 15 March 2026.
- All final papers will be subject to a peer-review process by the journal prior to being accepted for publication.
Special issue editors
Marguerite Borelli (CARISM, Paris-Panthéon-Assas University)
Ksenia Ermoshina (CIS, CNRS)
Francesca Musiani (CIS, CNRS)
Gulnara Zakharova (CARISM, Paris-Panthéon-Assas University)
Important dates
- 400 words abstracts should be sent to bigtechinsec@protonmail.com by 21 September 2025.
- Decisions will be sent to the authors by 15 December 2025.
- Full papers of the selected abstracts should be submitted by 15 March 2026.
- Submissions must be around 6,000 words in length and have to follow the submission guidelines of the Internet Policy Review. They will be peer-reviewed between March and June 2026.
- The planned publication date of this special issue is Q3 2026.
More information here: https://policyreview.info/events/call-papers-big-tech-global-security-governance